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INTRODUCTION
Context of ABS: General
Historically, the genetic resources were 
accessed for free, based on the worldview 
that the resources were global commons. 
But, gradually the monopolization of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge 
started, evidently, from 14th century. With the 
increased emphasis on intellectual property 
rights and private ownerships of products of 
genetic resources, this view changed over time 
and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
introduced a new legal framework where the 
sovereign rights of states over these resources 
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were established (Jospeh, 2010). Nevertheless, 
the practice of illegal access (piracy) continued 
unabated. Piracy has also been rampant on the 
derivatives of genetic resources (Richerzhagen, 
2010). Biopiracy also involves indigenous 
traditional knowledge (ITK) associated with 
genetic resources. 
For the first time in the history of illegal 
access of genetic resources by the user 
corporations and countries, the CBD made 
provisions for fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits (CBD, 1992)2. After negotiations and 
deliberations lasting over 16 years, the access 
and benefit-sharing protocol with regard to 
genetic resources laid the foundation for 
the international regime. On the occasion 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP.10) 
to the Convention3 on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) held on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, 
Japan, the CBD adopted Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising out of 
their Utilisation (the Nagoya Protocol) (CBD, 
2010). The Protocol opened for signature from 
2 February 2011 to 1 February 2012. Currently, 
there are 92 signatories to Nagoya Protocol 
and, it came into force on 12 October 2014 once 
the 53rd instrument of ratification was signed 
(CBD, 2014). The ABS regime established 
under Nagoya Protocol has been depicted 
in Fig. 1. The figure describes that if the 
genetic resources (existing in ex situ or in situ 
biodiversity) possessed by a provider country 
or its company/organization are accessed or 
utilized by a user or its company/organization 
for commercial or non-commercial purposes, 
the potential user needs to get prior informed 
consent (PIC) of the provider and sign mutually 
agreed terms (MAT) before actually accessing 
or utilizing, and later the user has to share the 
monetary or non-monetary benefits with the 
provider as per MAT.
3 
 
 
Fig.1: Diagrammatic representation of ABS system (Courtesy: CBD, 2011) Fig.1: Diagrammatic representation of ABS system (Courtesy: CBD, 2011)
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Context of ABS: Russia and India
Russia
The country’s fundamental biological 
research is carried out in the institutes and 
scientific centres of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. Work on the selection and preservation 
of diversity of plants and animals, regulation of 
«access and participation» in the agricultural 
sector has been regulated by the Russian 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Medical 
aspects of flora and fauna are dealt with the 
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. Studies 
of genetic resources are held in many educational 
universities and institutes, specialised institutes 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry of Natural Resources. Genetic 
resources in Russia are utilised by businesses 
such as industrial microbiology, plant breeding, 
breeding for commercial purposes, plants in 
nurseries, botanical gardens, zoos, etc. Access 
and benefit-sharing issues are very important in 
Russia because around 40 nationalities and ethnic 
groups with a total of more than 200,000 people 
reside in Siberia, North and the Far East regions. 
They live in highly rich diversity landscapes. In 
Russia, 28.3 million hectares of land is owned 
communally by ancestral farmers and 17.1 million 
hectares are reindeer pastures and forests. 
The issue of genetic resources and access to 
and participation in the benefits of Russia became 
important after the ratification of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity in 1995. Although the 
country has not yet signed Nagoya Protocol and 
not yet established a National Focal Point for ABS, 
the national and domestic ABS policy is under 
consideration by the Department of Environment 
and Environmental Security of the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and the Department of 
Science, Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade of the Russian Federation. Country 
is studying the opportunities and intricacies of 
the Nagoya Protocol and possible positions that 
Russia can take. In the Fifth National Report 
«Conservation of Biodiversity in the Russian 
Federation» (November, 2014), the special 
target and relevant goals4 were set. Further, in 
accordance with Aichi Targets the national goals5 
very well elaborate the preparations undergoing 
signing the Nagoya Protocol. Additionally, the 
ABS policy is important for Russia in view of 
huge diversity of life forms in the country and 
its increasing commercial utilization within and 
outside the country. 
India
India’s situation on ABS differs greatly 
from that of Russia, since India became a Party 
to Nagoya Protocol on 9 October 2012, whereas 
Russia has not even signed it. Further, in order 
to achieve the objectives of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), the Government of 
India enacted the Biological Diversity Act 2002 
and notified Biological Diversity Rules 2004. 
A three-tier structure – National Biodiversity 
Authority (NBA) at federal level, State 
Biodiversity Boards (SBBs) at provincial level and 
Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs) 
at community level–is in place to implement the 
ABS mechanisms. Implementation of the Act and 
Rules in India with a focus on ABS issues receives 
much attention now (Pisupati, 2012). During the 
past several years, the NBA has put a robust and 
responsive ABS system in place which is being 
refined and made user friendly on a regular basis. 
According to NBA, India’s engagement with ABS 
issues has been progressive and noteworthy. By 
the end of 2012, the NBA signed 100 agreements 
of ABS. Brazil which comes next has concluded 
just 10 agreements (NBA, 2012). In the words 
of erstwhile Chairman of NBA, “Conservation 
and sustainable use actions have been pursued 
by a range of local, national, regional and global 
initiatives, institutions and programmes, whereas 
ABS is a relatively new concept. There is a need 
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Table 1: List of Respondents
Respondent Group Q Type India Respondents Russia Respondents
A: Indigenous 
Peoples
Q.A Mizoram Chakma Development 
Forum (MCDF)
Centre for Support of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North (CSIPN)
A: Indigenous 
Peoples
Q.A NESAM TRUST Interregional Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of North of the 
Krasnoyarsk Region and Evenkiya
A: Indigenous 
Peoples
Q.A Citizens Foundation Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North, Siberia and the 
Far East (RAIPON)
A: Indigenous 
Peoples
Q.A Centre for Policy Solution Association "Aleskam"
A: Indigenous 
Peoples
Q.A M. Sudhakar (Individual) Inuit Society "YUPIK"
B: Party to CBD/ NP Q.B National Biodiversity Authority, 
Ministry of Environment & Forests
Department of Environmental 
Protection and Ecological Safety, 
Ministry of Natural Resources 
Q.A NAT-ABS = Format for Associations & Forums of Indigenous Peoples, Tribal Movements, CSOs & Individuals
Q.B IND-ABS = Format for Parties to CBD & Nagoya Protocol: Represented by CBD Primary/Secondary  NFP and ABS/
ICNP Focal Point or National Competent Authority
* About 40 different organisations of A group each were contacted in India and Russia for getting their opinions in Q.A 
questionnaire formats.
to tease out the operational elements of a system 
that responds to the ethics and equity questions on 
the ground. In the absence of specific and policy 
oriented focus on ABS, it is but natural that more 
efforts are being focused on understanding and 
implementing the ABS provisions both under 
CBD and Biological Diversity Act 2002” (DTE, 
2012). However, the progress on putting in place 
the three-tier system of biodiversity management 
has been patchy. The performance of BMCs is 
highly uneven. 
METHODOLOGY
Sampling 
Purposive sampling was adopted both for 
conducting the contents analysis of the domestic 
ABS measures of India and Russia, and for 
conducting the opinion survey. Before conducting 
the opinion survey, the list of possible respondent 
groups was identified as under:
A. Associations & forums of indigenous 
peoples, tribal movements
B. Parties to CBD & Nagoya Protocol (India: 
National Biodiversity Authority and CBD/
ABS National Focal Point in Ministry of 
Environment & Forests; Russia: CBD 
Primary National Focal Point)
The above mentioned respondent groups 
were contacted physically or electronically to 
express their opinions in two different types 
of questionnaires (Q.A and Q.B). The list of 
respondents is given in Table 1 below.
Research Techniques and Tools
This case study employed both non-reactive6 
(for example, content analysis and analysis of 
existing documents and secondary information) 
and reactive research (e.g. questionnaire survey) 
techniques. Depending on the nature, depth and 
importance of the variables7 and the purpose of 
research, the tools to gather/collate the data were 
chosen. The aspects of respondent categories 
were also taken into account when choosing the 
tools. All two types (as mentioned in Table 1) of 
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opinion survey questionnaires are appended as 
Annex. Q.A and Annex.Q.B. 
Timeframe
The India part of the opinion survey was 
carried out in late 2012 and early 2013, whereas 
the Russian part of the opinion survey was 
conducted in July–August 2013. Content analysis 
of ABS legislation or policies of India and Russia 
was also performed between March 2013 and 
October 2014. 
RESULTS
A. Participation of ILCs  
in National ABS Policy/Law Making  
and Negotiation Processes
On asking about the involvement of 
indigenous people and local communities (ILCs) 
in developing national ABS law/policy/guidelines 
in their respective countries, only 40 per cent 
and 20 per cent of the surveyed indigenous 
organisations/individuals, respectively, in India 
and Russia (Annex. Q.A: q.1) responded that their 
country involved/involves ILCs in developing 
national ABS instrument to little extent. Twenty 
per cent respondents in each country opined 
that their country did/does not involve ILCs 
in developing national ABS instrument. Thus, 
responses of sizeable respondents confirm that 
neither India nor Russia has good record of 
involving respective ILCs in making national 
ABS policy or law. 
Contrary to the responses of indigenous 
organisations/individuals, the competent 
government authorities of India (Annex. Q.B: 
q.1&2) confirmed the participation of ILCs 
in national ABS law/policy making to a great 
extent and active. However, Russian government 
authorities were found unaware of any such 
participation of ILCs in national ABS law/policy 
making, and validated no participation in the 
process (Annex. Q.B: q.1&2). Likewise, concerns, 
voices or viewpoints of ILCs were/are, to a great 
extent, respected, integrated or incorporated in 
the national ABS policy/law, according to Indian 
government authorities; while Russian authorities 
confirmed it “to some extent” on the question of 
respecting, integrating or incorporating in the 
national ABS policy/law the concerns, voices or 
viewpoints of ILCs (Annex. Q.B: q.3).
Surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals were questioned whether their 
country would “involve the ILCs in developing 
the prior informed consent (PIC) and mutually 
agreed terms (MAT) before allowing the user 
countries to access & utilise genetic resources 
or associated ITK held by ILCs” (Annex. Q.A: 
q.2). Only 20 per cent each of Indian and Russian 
respondents opined “affirmatively”. Another 20 
per cent of Indian respondents declined any such 
possible involvement of ILCs. In case of Russia, 
20 per cent respondents said that there was “no 
ABS instrument evolved or evolving in the 
country”. Lastly, the majority of respondents (60 
per cent) both in India and Russia gave no opinion 
on the question (Annex. Q.A: q.1). The analysis 
of the responses of indigenous organisations/ 
individuals, thus, indicates that there is remote 
possibility on part of India and Russia of involving 
the ILCs in developing the PIC and MAT. 
The majority of indigenous organisations/
individuals surveyed in India (80 per cent) 
expressed their views that India will ensure 
participation of ILCs in establishing the 
mechanisms to inform the potential users 
about their obligations before accessing any 
genetic resources and associated ITK, but that 
participation would not be effective (Annex. 
Q.A: q.3). The same response was conveyed by 
20 per cent of Russian respondents. A sizeable 
ratio of Russian respondents (40 per cent) said 
that “no ABS instrument evolved or evolving 
in the country” (Annex. Q.A: q.3). Therefore, 
Indian respondents have largely expressed their 
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opinions in favour of the participation of ILCs 
in establishing the mechanisms to inform the 
potential users about their obligations; while 
such participation of ILCs was reported low in 
Russia, partly because no ABS instrument is in 
place as yet. 
B. National Recognition  
of Customary Laws/Institutions of ILCs 
The majority of surveyed indigenous 
organisations/individuals in India (60 per cent) 
responded “affirmatively” that India respects, 
recognises and enforces the rights and ITK of 
its own indigenous people, but not truly (with 
no serious effort) (Annex. Q.A: q.4). However, 
40 per cent of Indian respondents declined that 
India respects, recognises and enforces the 
rights and ITK of its own indigenous people. 
Russian respondents showed varying trends in 
their responses–twenty per cent of them were 
“affirmative” that Russia respects, recognises and 
enforces the rights and ITK of its own indigenous 
people; and 40 per cent of them opined that Russia 
respects, recognises and enforces the rights and 
ITK of its own indigenous people, but not truly 
(with no serious effort) (Annex. Q.A: q.4). Thus, 
the trend of responses in both India and Russia 
exhibits that the countries only partially respect, 
recognise and enforce the rights and ITK of their 
own indigenous people.
Recognition of customary law/institutions of 
indigenous people by country’s ABS legislation/
policy has been confirmed by only 20 per cent of 
the surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals 
from India; while none of the respondents from 
Russia confirmed the same (Annex. Q.A: q.5). On 
the other hand, 20 per cent respondents each from 
India and Russia responded “negatively” on issues 
of recognition of customary law/institutions. 
However, the majority of respondents (60 per 
cent each) in both India and Russia were unaware 
of such issues (Annex. Q.A: q.5). Therefore, 
it is hereby summed up that the indigenous 
organisations/ individuals have the opinion that 
their respective country’s ABS legislation/policy 
recognises least the customary law/institutions of 
indigenous people. 
Contrary to the above, the national 
competent authorities of both India and Russia 
have responded “affirmatively” that existing/
evolving ABS legislation/policy recognises the 
customary law/institutions of indigenous people, 
according to Article.12.1 of Nagoya Protocol 
(Annex. Q.B: q.4). However, the analysis as given 
in section-5.1 does not reveal any provision in the 
existing/evolving ABS laws or policies of India 
or Russia. 
C. National Recognition of ILCs  
in Issuing PIC and MAT
“India’s ABS legislation/policy make 
the prior informed consent (PIC) mandatory 
before access/utilisation of genetic resources or 
associated ITK” has been confirmed by 40 per cent 
of surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals; 
while 20 per cent of Indian respondents indicate 
that the PIC is mentioned in India’s existing ABS 
legislation/policy, but it is not mandatory (Annex. 
Q.A: q.6). No respondent, on the other hand, from 
Russia responded as Indian respondents did. But, 
20 per cent of Russian indigenous respondents 
indicated that PIC is not in place in Russia’s 
evolving ABS law/policy, and 20 per cent of them 
say the no ABS law/policy is evolving in Russia 
(Annex. Q.A: q.6). India’s 40 per cent respondents 
and Russia’s 60 per cent respondents showed lack 
of awareness on the same. The analysis of the 
responses reveal that only India has scope of PIC 
of indigenous people in country’s ABS law, but 
PIC is not made mandatory in Indian law/policy. 
Analysis in section-5.1 above validates the fact 
that India’s ABS law/policy has been casual on 
the issue of PIC of indigenous people and has 
not considered the PIC mandatory before access/
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utilisation of genetic resources or associated 
ITK. The same is confirmed in the following lines 
too.
India’s national competent authorities opined 
“to some extent” on the question whether national 
ABS policy/law should respect the ILCs’ right 
to grant FPIC and right to sign MATs (Annex. 
Q.B: q.5). It indicates India’s lack of seriousness 
on necessity of PIC of indigenous people. On the 
other hand, Russian authorities expressed high 
need of respecting the ILCs’ right to grant FPIC 
and right to sign MATs and inculcate such needs 
in ABS law/policy (Annex. Q.B: q.5). 
Identical to the above response, India’s 
competent authority conveyed “the PIC is 
mentioned in existing/evolving ABS legislation/
policy, but it is not mandatory”, and Russian 
authorities said “there is no mention of PIC in 
our existing/evolving ABS legislation/policy” 
when they were asked “does your country’s 
ABS legislation/policy make the PIC mandatory 
before access/utilisation of genetic resources or 
associated ITK, in accordance with Article 6.1 
and Article 6.2 of Nagoya Protocol?” (Annex. 
Q.B: q.6). Indian authorities responded that 
India’s existing/evolving ABS legislation/
policy has a provision that the country’s ABS 
legislation/policy provides to ensure participation 
and involvement of ILCs in creating procedures/
format of PIC (Annex. Q.B: q.7). But the analysis 
of existing legislation in India given in section-5.1 
does not witness the same. Russia, on the other 
hand, has responded honestly that there is no such 
provision in existing/evolving ABS legislation/
policy ensuring participation and involvement 
of ILCs in creating procedures/format of PIC 
(Annex. Q.B: q.7). After all, it is known from the 
responses of government authorities that PIC is 
neither conceived nor incorporated in national 
ABS legislation/policy of India or Russia in the 
same spirit as it is envisaged in Article 6.1 and 
Article 6.2 of the Nagoya Protocol. However, 
both countries have shown their commitment to 
consult, involve or engage the ILCs in issuing the 
PIC to user Parties before accessing/utilising any 
genetic resources and associated ITK (Annex. 
Q.B: q.8). 
Both India’s and Russia’s competent 
authorities confirm that their ABS legislation/
policy includes provisions of drafting the 
mutually agreed terms (MAT) on equity 
principles, opposing the dominating positions 
of user countries (usually developed nations), as 
envisaged in Article 5.1 of the Nagoya Protocol 
(Annex. Q.B: q.9). The analysis given in section-
5.1 also reveals the same position of both the 
countries. Besides, both India and Russia have 
confirmed that their ABS legislation/policy 
provides for engaging ILCs in developing the 
MAT, in accordance with Article 12.3(b) of 
Nagoya Protocol (Annex. Q.B: q.10). It is reflected 
in the opinions of national competent authorities 
that the position of both the countries is quite 
strong in relation to executing MAT principles 
and involvement of ILCs therein. Yet, the opinion 
of indigenous organisations on this matter is 
missing. 
D. Importance of Community Protocols  
of ILCs in Countries
Surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals were asked to respond whether 
their country’s ABS legislation/policy provides 
for supporting the concerned ILCs to develop 
community protocols. Only 20 per cent of India’s 
respondents were “affirmative” that India’s ABS 
legislation/policy has provision in support of 
community protocols (Annex. Q.A: q.7). The rest 
majority of the respondents showed ignorance 
about such provisions in India’s ABS legislation/
policy. Similarly, the majority of surveyed 
indigenous organisations/individuals showed 
ignorance about such provisions in Russia’s 
evolving ABS legislation/policy (Annex. Q.A: 
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q.7). However, 20 per cent of Russian respondents 
denied any such provision in evolving ABS 
legislation/policy, while 20 per cent completely 
refused the existence of any ABS legislation/
policy in Russia (Annex. Q.A: q.7). Thus, the 
responses of indigenous organisations/individuals 
indicate that evolving/existing national ABS 
legislation/policy has no real importance given 
to community protocol, if any such provision 
exists. The same questions were responded to by 
national competent authority of only Russia by 
saying that no such provision existed in evolving 
ABS legislation/policy (Annex. Q.B: q.11 & 12).
E. Access of ILCs to Bioresources  
in their Territories
On the one hand, the entire world is talking 
about access of users of any country to the 
biological resources existing in any country 
of the world; but on other side, the majority of 
countries restrict their own ILCs to access the 
same bioresources. So, the question “does your 
country restrict the ILCs’ access to bioresources 
in forests and protected areas” was floated to 
the respondents. Both in India and Russia, 20 
per cent of surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals confirmed that there was absolute 
restriction of ILCs’ access to bioresources in 
forests and protected areas. Besides, 80 per cent 
of Indian respondents and 40 per cent of Russian 
respondents confirmed selective restriction 
of ILCs’ access to bioresources in forests and 
protected areas (Annex. Q.A: q.8). Therefore, it 
is revealed from the analysis that both India and 
Russia put restrictions on their own ILCs’ access 
to bioresources in forests and protected areas. 
On the contrary to the above, India’s competent 
authorities opined reverse saying that they do not 
restrict the ILCs’ access to bioresources in forests 
and protected areas (Annex. Q.B: q.13). Yet, the 
ground observations and Indian laws like Indian 
Forest Act 1927 and Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972 
confirm full/partial restrictions on ILCs’ access 
to bioresources in forests and protected areas. 
But, Russian authorities accepted the selective 
restriction on ILCs’ access to bioresources in 
forests and protected areas (Annex. Q.B: q.13). 
On the question of whether their country 
ensures the rights of ILCs to exchange genetic 
resources and ITK within and amongst themselves 
or not, the majority of indigenous organisations/
individuals (60 per cent) were not aware of the 
issue in both India and Russia (Annex. Q.A: q.9). 
Only 40 per cent responded in each country, of 
whom 20 per cent in each responded group said 
that their respective country partially ensures 
the rights of ILCs to exchange genetic resources 
and ITK within and among themselves, whereas 
the other 20 per cent each responded that their 
respective country restricts ILCs exchanging 
genetic resources and ITK within and among 
themselves (Annex. Q.A: q.9). So, it is pertinent 
to draw a conclusion that both India and Russia 
do not support much the ILCs to exchange genetic 
resources and ITK within and among themselves. 
But, national competent authorities of India 
responded differently saying that India fully 
ensures the rights of ILCs to exchange genetic 
resources and ITK within and among themselves 
(Annex. Q.B: q.14). However, Russian authorities 
confirmed that Russia partially ensures the rights 
of ILCs to exchange genetic resources and ITK 
within and among themselves (Annex. Q.B: 
q.14).
F. Fair and Equitable Sharing  
of Benefits
Only 20 per cent each of India’s and Russia’s 
surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals 
confirmed that the Nagoya Protocol would 
ensure fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilisation of genetic resources 
and indigenous traditional knowledge (ITK) 
associated with genetic resources (Annex. Q.A: 
– 273 –
Hasrat Arjjumend, Sabiha Alam… Comparative Analysis of Access and Benefit Sharing Regimes in India and Russia…
q.10). India’s 60 per cent and Russia’s 20 per 
cent respondents were clueless about it; while 20 
per cent of Indian respondents negated the same 
(Annex. Q.A: q.10). The majority (60 per cent) of 
Russian respondents opined that their country 
would likely to share the received benefits with 
ILCs (Annex. Q.A: q.10). It is thus understood 
that the indigenous organisations have least 
confidence that the governments of India as well 
as Russia would share received benefits with ILCs 
holding the accessed/utilised genetic resource or 
associated ITK. 
National competent authorities of both India 
and Russia have responded “affirmatively” on 
the recognition of ILCs in national ABS policy/
law over users’ access to genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, and over sharing 
of benefits arising out of utilisation of genetic 
resources (Annex. Q.B: q.15). To the question 
“does your country’s ABS legislation/policy 
provide for sharing benefits with concerned ILCs 
in a fair and equitable way, as envisaged in Article 
5.2 & Article 5.5 of Nagoya Protocol”, Indian 
authorities responded “positively”, while Russian 
authorities did “negatively” (Annex. Q.B: q.16). 
Although Indian authorities have confirmed very 
confidently that India’s ABS legislation/policy 
provides for sharing benefits with concerned ILCs 
in a fair and equitable way, yet the observations 
do not confirm a fully evolved mechanism to share 
the benefits with ILCs in a fair and equitable 
manner. 
G. Access to Genetic Resources  
and Space for ILCs
India’s competent authorities responded 
that the country’s ABS legislation/policy ensures 
effective participation of ILCs in establishing 
the mechanisms to inform the potential users of 
ITK about their obligations, in accordance with 
Article 12.2 of Nagoya Protocol; while Russian 
authorities also responded the same but their ABS 
legislation/policy ensures the participation as 
not effective (Annex Q.B: q.18). India confirmed 
that country’s existing/evolving ABS legislation/
policy provides for disclosing the information in 
a language understandable to our ILCs; while 
Russia did not confirm the same (Annex Q.B: 
q.19). It thus indicates that India leads Russia in 
the participation of ILCs in matters pertaining to 
information obligations of potential users of ITK 
and their obligations of disclosing the information 
in a language understandable to our ILCs.
H. Associated Traditional Knowledge  
and ILCs Rights
Both India and Russia responded 
“affirmatively” on question of truly respecting, 
recognising and enforcing the rights and ITK 
of their own indigenous people (Annex Q.B: 
q.20). Unfortunately, the opinions of indigenous 
organisations could not be gathered, so it is hard 
to make a comparison. 
I. Involvement of ILCs in Monitoring  
of Access to Genetic Resources
Responding to the question whether country’s 
ABS legislation/policy (or administrative 
measure) involves ILCs in monitoring of the 
access and utilisation of genetic resources or 
associated ITK by the users, 60 per cent of 
surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals 
from India said that “there is no such provision in 
existing ABS legislation/policy or administrative 
measure” (Annex Q.A: q.11); while 40 per cent 
of the Indian respondents were unaware of 
the issue. In Russian contexts, 40 per cent of 
surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals 
highlighted that no ABS instrument or evolving 
in the country (Annex Q.A: q.11). The majority 
of Russian respondents (60 per cent) were 
unaware of the issue. So, currently India has 
scope of involving the ILCs in monitoring of 
the access and utilisation of genetic resources 
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or associated ITK by the users, but according 
to the majority of indigenous organisations, the 
existing ABS legislation/policy does not have 
such a provision. 
The majority of the surveyed indigenous 
organisations/individuals from India (60 per 
cent) responded that India will involve the ILCs 
(but for namesake) in monitoring the access and 
utilisation of genetic resources or associated 
ITK by the user countries (usually developed 
countries) (Annex. Q.A: q.12); while in Russia, 
20 per cent of respondents opined the same. In 
Russia, 40 per cent of surveyed respondents said 
that no ABS instrument is evolved in the country 
(Annex. Q.A: q.12). In both India and Russia, 40 
per cent of the respondents each were unaware 
of the issue. It shows that India and Russia might 
involve the ILCs in monitoring the access and 
utilisation of genetic resources or associated ITK 
by the user countries, but for namesake. 
Above the same question has been replied 
by India’s competent authorities “affirmatively”, 
saying that India’s existing ABS legislation/
policy or administrative measure involves ILCs 
in monitoring the access/utilisation of genetic 
resources by the users (Annex. Q.B: q.21); while 
Russian authorities clearly say that there is no such 
provision in existing/evolving ABS legislation/
policy or administrative measure. 
J. Check of Biopiracy 
The surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals were lastly asked: “And if your 
country’s government agencies/institutes or 
corporations are involved in illegal transfer/ 
transportation of genetic resource to user country/
corporation, will the ILCs be able to check the 
illegal transfer (misappropriation)?” Russia’s 20 
per cent respondents said that their ILCs are able 
to check the illegal transfer (misappropriation), but 
with mixed results (Annex. Q.A: q.13). However, 
another 20 per cent of Russian respondents opined 
that their ILCs are able to check successfully the 
illegal transfer (misappropriation). Still, Russia’s 
other 20 per cent respondents and India’s 60 per 
cent respondents claimed that their ILCs are NOT 
able to check successfully the illegal transfer 
(misappropriation) (Annex. Q.A: q.13). The data 
of the responses exhibits that Russia’s indigenous 
organisations are positive about their ILCs that 
they would be able to check the biopiracy, while 
India’s indigenous organisations showed no 
confidence in their ILCs that they might check the 
biopiracy. 
Both India’s and Russia’s 20 per cent 
each of surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals gave their opinions that ABS regime 
at the international level and national ABS 
regime would be able to stop to a large extent 
the biopiracy (if any) of their country’s genetic 
resources and associated ITK (Annex. Q.A: q.14). 
Simultaneously, 40 per cent of India’s and 60 
per cent of Russia’s respondents indicated that 
international and national ABS regime would 
be able to stop to some extent the biopiracy (if 
any) of their country’s genetic resources and 
associated ITK (Annex. Q.A: q.14). Similarly, 40 
per cent respondents from India and 20 per cent 
respondents from Russia opined that international 
and national ABS regime would not at all be able 
to stop the biopiracy (if any) of their country’s 
genetic resources and associated ITK (Annex. 
Q.A: q.14). Therefore, India’s surveyed indigenous 
organisations/individuals were not very much 
pessimistic that the biopiracy of India’s genetic 
resources and associated ITK would be checked 
by international or national ABS regime; while 
the Russian counterpart respondents expressed 
the same relatively positively. 
DISCUSSION
Present research paper compares the 
recognition, involvement, space, benefit sharing 
and acknowledgement being extended by Indian 
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and Russian governments to their respective 
indigenous people and local communities. The 
study conducted was based on opinion surveys 
of indigenous organisations/individuals and 
national competent authorities. The analyses 
of existing/evolving laws or policies dealing 
with ABS also became part of the study. The 
majority of surveyed indigenous organisations/
individuals showed that India has advanced in 
terms of evolving the national ABS law/policy, 
while majority of the respondents in Russia did 
not confirm the development of national ABS 
law/policy in their country. 
The issue of participation in ABS policy/
law making and negotiation process at 
international and national contexts is worth 
understanding. Responses of the surveyed 
indigenous organisations reveal a grim picture 
of the participation of ILCs in the national 
ABS policy/law making process. According 
to them, neither India nor Russia has a good 
record of involving respective ILCs in making 
national ABS policy or law. On the contrary, 
Indian respondents have largely expressed their 
opinions in favour of the participation of ILCs 
in establishing the mechanisms to inform the 
potential users about their obligations; while such 
participation of ILCs was reported low in Russia, 
partly because no ABS instrument is in place as 
yet. Conclusively, it is well understood that the 
responses of indigenous people and the states are 
mixed about the participation and involvement 
of ILCs in national policy/law or administrative 
measures processes. 
Customary laws and institutions of 
indigenous people have paramount importance 
in conserving and managing the biological 
resources and associated ITK. Simultaneously, it 
is also a fact that the customary laws and rules 
of indigenous people or local communities are 
seldom documented and taken into account in 
national laws or administrative mechanisms. The 
trend of responses in both India and Russia also 
exhibits that the countries only partially respect, 
recognise and enforce the rights and ITK of own 
indigenous people. The indigenous organisations/
individuals have the opinion that their respective 
country’s ABS legislation/policy recognises least 
the customary law/institutions of indigenous 
people. It provides a basis of popular perceptions 
that the ILCs are given no or least importance in 
national regimes even in their own territories. 
The Article 6.1 and Article 6.2 of the Nagoya 
Protocol equip the states with the prior informed 
consent (PIC), which is the most powerful tool 
to empower the ILCs if used realistically. The 
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol have obligations 
of getting PIC before allowing any access to or 
utilisation of biological resource and associated 
ITK. Despite these obligations, India’s ABS law/
policy has been casual on the issue of PIC of 
indigenous people and has not considered the PIC 
mandatory before access/utilisation of genetic 
resources or associated ITK. It is known from 
the responses of government authorities that PIC 
is neither conceived nor incorporated in national 
ABS legislation/policy of India or Russia in the 
same spirit, as it is envisaged in Article 6.1 and 
Article 6.2 of the Nagoya Protocol. Particularly in 
India, the PIC process is more or less manipulated 
in the sense that the state itself gives PIC and 
then signs the mutually agreed terms (MAT) in 
order to allow the access to and utilisation of the 
genetic resources or associated ITK. Said clauses 
of Nagoya Protocol also provide for obligation 
of Parties to involve the ILCs in signing MAT 
agreements with the users of genetic resources or 
associated ITK. 
It is reflected in the opinions of national 
competent authorities that the position of both 
countries is quite strong in relation to executing 
MAT principles and involvement of ILCs therein. 
As the opinion of indigenous organisations on 
this matter was not recorded, the people’s version 
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on the participation of ILCs in MAT agreements 
is thus unavailable. Similarly, Article 12(3)a of 
the Nagoya Protocol has obligation on state to 
support the ILCs to prepare their “community 
protocols”, but efforts for such community 
protocols have been undertaken sporadically and 
with scanty support of the state. To substantiate 
this observation, the responses of indigenous 
organisations/individuals indicate that evolving/
existing national ABS legislation/policy has no 
real importance given to community protocol, if 
any such provision exists. 
In general, the biodiversity conservation 
programmes have excluded the local and 
indigenous people from ecosystems. When the 
Nagoya Protocol talks about free and unlimited 
access to and utilisation of biological resources of 
one country by other countries and corporations 
of same country, the access to and utilisation of 
same bioresources by ILCs who are custodians of 
those resources are denied by national laws. The 
same is revealed from the opinion survey that 
both India and Russia put restrictions on their 
own ILCs’ access to bioresources in forests and 
protected areas. It is pertinent to draw a conclusion 
that both India and Russia do not support much 
the ILCs to exchange genetic resources and ITK 
within and among themselves. 
Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol, which 
is the core segment of the protocol, stresses on 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilisation of genetic resources and 
associated ITK. Parties are obliged to comply 
with the given clauses and to ensure the creation 
and enforcement of domestic legislation in that 
regard. Since India has already evolved such 
legislation and is trying to place the mechanisms 
of fair and equitable sharing of benefits with the 
ILCs, Indian authorities have confirmed very 
confidently that India’s ABS legislation/policy 
provides for sharing benefits with concerned 
ILCs in a fair and equitable way. However, the 
field observations do not confirm a fully evolved 
mechanism to share the benefits with ILCs in a 
fair and equitable manner. A few examples were 
quoted as demonstrating the benefit of sharing 
in an equitable manner (NBA, 2012). Example 
of the Kani tribe of Kerala province whose TK 
was used to develop an Ayurvedic medicine and 
some benefits were shared with the community; 
but this model also failed in due course of time. 
On the other hand, Russia is yet to evolve even 
a consolidated legislation on ABS; thus, the 
examples of fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
literally do not exist in the country. Opinions of 
indigenous organisations led to understand that the 
ILCs have least confidence that the governments 
of India or Russia would share received benefits 
with ILCs holding the accessed/utilised genetic 
resource or associated ITK. Overall, it gives a 
sense that the mechanisms of sharing the benefits 
fairly and equitably would take quite a long time 
to be established in the countries provided the 
efforts are made seriously by the governments.
Article 12.2 of the Nagoya Protocol 
calls for the establishment of mechanisms to 
inform potential users of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources about their 
obligations with the effective participation of 
ILCs concerned. The Parties have to comply with 
the obligations. Responses of national competent 
authorities have revealed that India leads Russia 
in the participation of ILCs in matters pertaining 
to information obligations of potential users 
of ITK and their obligations of disclosing the 
information in a language understandable to our 
ILCs. However, evidence is missing that the same 
is linked with the Clearing-House mechanism at 
CBD Secretariat.
The Nagoya Protocol contains the provisions 
of involving the ILCs in monitoring of access to 
genetic resources, and thus Parties are obliged to 
comply with the given provisions. Otherwise too, 
it would be ideal if the ILCs were given space 
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and they would have regulated the monitoring of 
users’ access to genetic resources. Currently, India 
has scope of involving the ILCs in monitoring 
the access and utilisation of genetic resources or 
associated ITK by the users; but according to the 
majority of respondent indigenous organisations, 
the existing ABS legislation/policy of India 
does not have such a provision. Analysis further 
shows that India and Russia might involve the 
ILCs in monitoring the access and utilisation of 
genetic resources or associated ITK by the user 
countries, but for namesake. As a matter of fact, 
the bureaucracies actually having control over 
all mechanisms and processes lack willingness 
to devolve and thus involve the ILCs in critical 
functions such as monitoring of access. 
Underlying the genesis of ABS was the 
thinking of checking the biopiracy and illegal 
utilisation of genetic resources followed by 
patenting it. Under the obligations of the Nagoya 
Protocol, the Parties are to take measures to 
regulate the illegitimate access and utilisation 
of genetic resources and associated ITK. India’s 
surveyed indigenous organisations/individuals 
were not very much pessimistic that the biopiracy 
of India’s genetic resources and associated ITK 
would be checked by international or national 
ABS regime; while the Russian counterpart 
respondents expressed the same relatively 
positively. Additionally, the ILCs might check the 
biopiracy once they are educated and empowered 
to do so; however, the current capacities of ILCs 
in India and Russia do vary, according to the 
opinions of indigenous organisations. The data 
of the responses exhibits that Russia’s indigenous 
organisations are positive about their ILCs that 
they would be able to check the biopiracy, while 
India’s indigenous organisations showed no 
confidence on their ILCs that they might check 
the biopiracy. In either situation, without checking 
the biopiracy, the objectives of ABS cannot be 
realised adequately. 
CONCLUSION  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
India’s progressive legislation on ABS 
(i.e. Biological Diversity Act, 2002) has 
certain provisions recognising the role and 
participation needs of indigenous people and 
local communities (ILCs) in conserving the 
biological resources and associated ITK. Beyond 
this recognition, the legal framework provides 
for the involvement of ILCs through biodiversity 
management committee (BMCs) in preparation 
of people’s biodiversity registers (PBRs) and 
issuance of mutually agreed terms (MAT). 
The Biological Diversity Act, 200, however, 
lacks any mention that the prior informed 
consent (PIC) is prerequisite of allowing users 
access to and utilisation of genetic resources 
and associated ITK, whereas, on the contrary 
the Nagoya Protocol8 makes the PIC essential 
before accessing a genetic material or associated 
ITK. Therefore, although the ILCs are given 
due recognition and appreciation in the ABS 
law, yet, the said legislation does not enable the 
empowerment of ILCs in the whole process. 
The existing mechanisms in place of ABS also 
do not conform to ILCs as primary stakeholders 
and the owners of biological resources. 
The widespread practice of concluding 
agreements or arrangements on benefit sharing is 
missing in Russia. It is in fact still in evolution 
phase. Before signing the Nagoya Protocol, 
the Russian Federation has been studying the 
ABS processes and legislation in various other 
countries. At present, the contractual arrangements 
(mainly in the field of industrial microbiology, 
pharmacology and biotechnology) regulate the 
access to genetic resources and participation in 
the benefits of their use. But these agreements 
underrate the interests of ILCs as primary 
stakeholders. Hence, the Russian authorities need 
to start from scratch to promulgate and enact the 
ABS legislation. 
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Despite the emphasis given in the 
Nagoya Protocol on the need to recognise and 
incorporate the customary laws and institutions, 
both the countries seldom have given attention 
to customary laws and institutions of 
indigenous people; hence, it provides a basis 
of popular perceptions that the ILCs are given 
no or least importance in national regimes 
and even in their own territories. Moreover, 
despite the obligations of the Nagoya Protocol 
of getting prior informed consent (PIC) 
before allowing any access to or utilisation 
of biological resource and associated ITK, 
both India and Russia have been casual on the 
issue of PIC of indigenous people and have not 
considered the PIC mandatory before access/
utilisation of genetic resources or associated 
ITK. Almost similar is the status of involving 
the ILCs in signing MAT agreements. Equally 
poor is the record of governments supporting 
the preparation of Community Protocol by 
indigenous people. In general, the biodiversity 
conservation programmes have excluded the 
local and indigenous people from ecosystems. 
Reportedly, India and Russia do not support 
much the ILCs to exchange genetic resources 
and ITK within and among themselves. 
Fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources 
and associated ITK is the key of the ABS 
framework. India, being the leading country in 
the ABS legislation and mechanism in place, 
could not yet develop in true sense the system 
of fair and equitable sharing of benefits. On the 
other hand, Russia still has to walk a long way. 
Overall, the mechanisms of sharing the benefits 
fairly and equitably would take a long time to be 
established in the countries, provided the efforts 
are made seriously by the governments. The next 
crucial aspect of biodiversity governance is the 
involvement of ILCs in monitoring access to 
genetic resources. As the leading country in ABS 
system in place, India’s existing ABS legislation/
policy does not have a provision of involving the 
ILCs in monitoring of users’ access to genetic 
resources. This study reveals that India and Russia 
might involve the ILCs in monitoring the access 
and utilisation of genetic resources or associated 
ITK by the user countries, but they would do it 
for namesake. 
Under the obligations of the Nagoya Protocol, 
the Parties are to take measures to regulate the 
illegitimate access and utilisation of genetic 
resources and associated ITK. India’s biopiracy 
would likely be checked by international or 
national ABS regime; while Russia has some 
hope that the biopiracy would be checked. After 
all, without checking biopiracy, the objectives 
of ABS cannot be realised adequately, and the 
ILCs would not receive due respect and share in 
the benefits accrued from utilization of genetic 
resources. 
Recommendations for India
India’s existing legislation and ABS 
mechanisms require some fundamental changes, 
such as:
•	 Provisions are included to make the PIC 
of ILCs mandatory before any access 
to and utilisation of biological (genetic) 
resources and associated ITK;
•	 Domestic companies and research 
establishments accessing/utilising the 
genetic resources should also be brought 
under the ambit of prior approval 
of National Biodiversity Authority 
(NBA);
•	 ILCs need to be necessarily involved in 
monitoring the users’ access to biological 
resources and associated ITK;
•	 Checkpoints should be created with the 
active involvement of ILCs; and
•	 The competent authorities (for example, 
the NBA and State Biodiversity Boards) 
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should devise mechanisms to check the 
biopiracy.
Recommendations for Russia
It is hoped that Russia will join the major 
international processes in the period of 5–10 
years. During this time, it is necessary for the 
authorities:
•	 To practice contractual agreements that 
take into account the interests of all 
parties to the proceedings;
•	 Streamline the accounting system 
(depository), control and monitoring of 
transactions (agreements) within the 
country and in the international market 
(through Clearing-House Mechanism);
•	 To form the consolidated legal framework 
on ABS and to evolve the ABS 
mechanisms;
•	 To engage in the process of ILCs 
through a series of demonstration 
projects; and
•	 To carry out an economic assessment of 
strategic genetic resources of the country 
and to assess the possible benefits at 
the national, regional and local levels, 
including specific reserves and national 
parks.
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1 The term has been connoted by CBD and widely used in Nagoya Protocol. During COP12 of CBD in Pyeongchang   the 
debate centred around the use of the term “Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs)” instead of the cur-
rent phrase “Indigenous and Local Communities (ILCs)”. After a series of interventions a draft text was formulated 
related to the use the term “Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities” in future decisions and secondary documents 
under the Convention.  These efforts resulted to the adoption of “Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities” without 
formally changing the original Convention. http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/convention-biological-diversity-cbd/
news/2014/11/cop12-agrees-use-indigenous-peoples-and-loca 
2 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, 31 Int”l Leg. Mat. 818 (1992), Article 1.
3 Convention has been adopted by almost all states, with a total 193 Parties including the European Union. A noticeable 
exception is the United States, which as a non-Party to the CBD cannot become a party to the Nagoya Protocol, cf. Article 
33(1) of the Protocol.
4 National goal on biodiversity conservation > By 2015, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is in force and operational, consistent with national leg-
islation. Source: http://strategy2014.ru/
5 National Goals (Target 16): 1. Facilitate ratification of the Nagoya Protocol in the Russian Federation; 2. Harmonize 
national legislation in accordance with the implementation of Russian Federation’s commitments under the Nagoya Pro-
tocol; 3. Define organizational structure needed for implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in the Russian Federation; 4. 
Create conditions for effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol at the national and regional levels. Source: http://
strategy2014.ru/
6 Non-reactive research is a class of measures in which people being studied are unaware that they are part of a study. 
In non-reactive or unobtrusive measures, the people being studied are not aware of it but leave evidence of their social 
behaviour or actions “naturally”. Creating non-reactive measures follows the logic of quantitative measurement, although 
qualitative researchers also use non-reactive observation. Because non-reactive measures indicate a construct indirectly, 
the researcher needs to rule out reasons for the observation other than the construct of interest. 
7 Operational definition of the variable includes how the researcher systematically notes and records observations.
8 Article 6.1 of Nagoya Protocol
9 Этот термин был введен Конвенцией о биологическом разнообразии и широко используется в Нагойском про-
токоле. Во время COP12 Конвенции в г. Пхенчхан шли дебаты вокруг использования термина «коренные народы 
и местные общины (IPLCs)» вместо текущего термина «коренные и местные общины (ILCs)». После серии ме-
роприятий был сформулирован проект текста по применению термина «коренные народы и местные общины» в 
будущих решениях и вторичных документах в соответствии с Конвенцией. Эти усилия привели к принятию тер-
мина «коренные народы и местные общины», без формального изменения первоначального текста Конвенции. 
http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/convention-biological-diversity-cbd/news/2014/11/cop12-agrees-use-indigenous-
peoples-and-loca
Hasrat Arjjumend, Sabiha Alam… Comparative Analysis of Access and Benefit Sharing Regimes in India and Russia…
REFERENCES
Biswajit Dhar and Anuradha R.V., Access, Benefit Sharing, Intellectual Property Rights: 
Establishing Linkages between the Agreement on TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2005. Available at http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/Papers/2.pdf, accessed on 27 November 2010.
CBD, Access and benefit-sharing information kit. Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 
2011. http://www.cbd.int/abs
CBD, http://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/default.shtml, accessed on 5 December 
2014.
CBD, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. CBD Secretariat, 
2010. http://www.cbd.int/abs 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Article 1, 5 June 
1992.
DTE, 2012. The Hunt for Benefits. Down To Eath, October 1–15, 2012. www.downtoearth.org.in. 
Evanson C. Kamau, Fedder, Bevis and Winter, Gerd, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing: What is New and What are the Implications for Provider and User Countries and the Scientific 
Community”, 6/3 Law, Environment and Development Journal (LEAD), 2011.
Jospeh, Reji K., International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing: Where Are We Now? 12/3 
Asian Biotechnology and Development Review, 77–94, 2010.
NBA, Access and Benefit Sharing Experiences from India. National Biodiversity Authority, 
Chennai. www.nbaindia.org, accessed on 30 December 2012. 
Pisupati, Balakrishnan, Biodiversity Governance: Lessons for International Environmental 
Governance. Chennai: National Biodiversity Authority, 2012. 
Richerzhagen, Carmen, Protecting Biological Diversity: The Effectiveness of Access and Benefit 
Sharing Regimes, Routledge, 2010.
ABBREVIATIONS
ABS Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising out of 
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na
l A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t (
1)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e 
(3
)
0% 20
%
20
%
0% 60
%
W
il
l y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y 
in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
th
e 
pr
io
r i
nf
or
m
ed
 
co
ns
en
t (
PI
C
) 
an
d 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 
te
rm
s 
(M
A
T
) 
be
fo
re
 a
ll
ow
in
g 
th
e 
us
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s t
o 
ac
ce
ss
 &
 u
til
iz
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
or
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
IT
K
 
he
ld
 b
y 
IL
C
s?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
IL
C
s 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T,
 b
ut
 f
or
 n
am
es
ak
e 
on
ly
. (
1)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
at
 a
ll
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
3)
0% 20
%
20
%
0% 60
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
IL
C
s 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T,
 b
ut
 f
or
 n
am
es
ak
e 
on
ly
. (
1)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
at
 a
ll
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
PI
C
 a
nd
 M
A
T.
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(1
)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
3)
0% 20
%
0% 20
%
60
%
D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
at
 y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 
w
ill
 e
ns
ur
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 y
ou
r 
IL
C
s 
in
 e
st
ab
li
sh
in
g 
th
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
us
er
s a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 b
ef
or
e 
ac
ce
ss
in
g 
an
y 
ge
ne
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 I
T
K
?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 o
ur
 
IL
C
s,
 b
ut
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
 (4
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y.
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (1
)
0% 80
%
0% 20
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 o
ur
 
IL
C
s,
 b
ut
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y.
 (2
)
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (2
)
0% 20
%
40
%
40
%
Q
U
E
ST
IO
N
S
 O
F
 O
PI
N
IO
N
 
SU
R
V
E
Y
IN
D
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
U
SS
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
B
. N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 O
F
 C
U
ST
O
M
A
R
Y
 L
A
W
S
/I
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
S
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
D
oe
s y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 tr
ul
y 
re
sp
ec
t, 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
an
d 
en
fo
rc
e 
th
e 
rig
ht
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 o
f 
yo
ur
 o
w
n 
in
di
ge
no
us
 
pe
op
le
? 
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 d
oe
s.
 
Y
es
, b
ut
 n
ot
 tr
ul
y.
 (3
)
N
o.
 (2
)
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
.
0% 60
%
40
%
0%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 d
oe
s.
 (1
)
Y
es
, b
ut
 n
ot
 tr
ul
y.
 (2
)
N
o.
 (1
)
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
. (
1)
20
%
40
%
20
%
20
%
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
th
e 
cu
st
om
ar
y 
la
w
/in
st
itu
tio
ns
 o
f y
ou
r 
in
di
ge
no
us
 p
eo
pl
e?
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 
ha
s s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
 (1
)
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (3
)
20
%
20
%
0% 60
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 
ha
s s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(1
)
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (3
)
0% 20
%
20
%
60
%
C
. N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
IN
 I
SS
U
IN
G
 P
IC
 A
N
D
 M
A
T
 
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
PI
C
 
m
an
da
to
ry
 b
ef
or
e 
ac
ce
ss
/u
til
iz
at
io
n 
of
 g
en
et
ic
 re
so
ur
ce
s o
r a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
IT
K
?
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
an
da
to
ry
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 
A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
 (2
)
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 
A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 n
ot
 m
an
da
to
ry
. (
1)
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
m
en
ti
on
 o
f 
PI
C
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
. (
2)
40
%
20
%
0% 0% 40
%
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
an
da
to
ry
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 
A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 
A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 n
ot
 m
an
da
to
ry
.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
m
en
ti
on
 o
f 
PI
C
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(1
)
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
. (
3)
0% 0% 20
%
20
%
60
%
D
. I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E
 T
O
 C
O
M
M
U
N
IT
Y
 P
R
O
T
O
C
O
L
S
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
su
pp
or
ti
ng
 th
e 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
IL
C
s 
to
 
de
ve
lo
p 
co
m
m
un
ity
 p
ro
to
co
ls
 o
f 
yo
ur
 in
di
ge
no
us
 p
eo
pl
e?
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 
ha
s s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
 (1
)
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (4
)
20
%
0% 0% 80
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 
ha
s s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(1
)
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
 (3
)
0% 20
%
20
%
60
%
Q
U
E
ST
IO
N
S
 O
F
 O
PI
N
IO
N
 
SU
R
V
E
Y
IN
D
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
U
SS
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
E
. A
C
C
E
SS
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
T
O
 B
IO
R
E
SO
U
R
C
E
S
 I
N
 T
H
E
IR
 T
E
R
R
IT
O
R
IE
S
 
D
oe
s y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 re
st
ric
t t
he
 
IL
C
s’
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 b
io
re
so
ur
ce
s 
in
 
fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
re
as
? 
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 f
ul
ly
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
bi
or
es
ou
rc
es
 in
 fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
re
as
 (1
)
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 s
el
ec
ti
ve
ly
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 b
io
re
so
ur
ce
s i
n 
fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 
ar
ea
s. 
(4
)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
es
tr
ic
t o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
bi
or
es
ou
rc
es
 in
 fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
re
as
.
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
.
20
%
80
%
0% 0%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 f
ul
ly
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
bi
or
es
ou
rc
es
 in
 fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
re
as
 (1
)
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 s
el
ec
ti
ve
ly
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 b
io
re
so
ur
ce
s i
n 
fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 
ar
ea
s. 
(2
)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
es
tr
ic
t o
ur
 I
L
C
s’
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
bi
or
es
ou
rc
es
 in
 fo
re
st
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
re
as
.
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
2)
20
%
40
%
0% 40
%
D
oe
s y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
to
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
m
se
lv
es
? 
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 f
ul
ly
 e
ns
ur
es
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
to
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
m
se
lv
es
.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 p
ar
ti
al
ly
 e
ns
ur
es
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
to
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
m
se
lv
es
. (
1)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ex
ch
an
gi
ng
 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t 
th
em
se
lv
es
. (
1)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
3)
0% 20
%
20
%
60
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 f
ul
ly
 e
ns
ur
es
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
to
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
m
se
lv
es
.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 p
ar
ti
al
ly
 e
ns
ur
es
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
to
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
m
se
lv
es
. (
1)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 r
es
tr
ic
ts
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ex
ch
an
gi
ng
 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
IT
K
 w
it
hi
n 
an
d 
am
on
gs
t 
th
em
se
lv
es
. (
1)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
3)
0% 20
%
20
%
60
%
F.
 F
A
IR
 A
N
D
 E
Q
U
IT
A
B
L
E
 S
H
A
R
IN
G
 O
F
 B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
 
W
ill
 y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 fu
rt
he
r s
ha
re
 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
[r
ec
ei
ve
d 
fr
om
 u
se
r 
co
un
tr
ie
s (
us
ua
lly
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s)
] 
w
it
h 
yo
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ho
ld
in
g 
th
e 
ac
ce
ss
ed
/u
til
iz
ed
 g
en
et
ic
 
re
so
ur
ce
 o
r 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 I
T
K
?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
en
efi
ts
 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s 
ju
di
ci
ou
sly
.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
en
efi
ts
 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s, 
bu
t o
nl
y 
a 
fr
ac
tio
n.
 (1
)
It
 is
 li
ke
ly
 th
at
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 
be
ne
fit
s 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s.
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
w
it
h 
IL
C
s.
 (1
)
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
. (
3)
0% 20
%
0% 20
%
60
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
en
efi
ts
 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s 
ju
di
ci
ou
sly
.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
en
efi
ts
 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s, 
bu
t o
nl
y 
a 
fr
ac
tio
n.
 (1
)
It
 is
 li
ke
ly
 th
at
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 
be
ne
fit
s 
w
ith
 I
L
C
s.
 (3
)
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 s
ha
re
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
w
it
h 
IL
C
s.
I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
. (
1)
0% 20
%
60
%
0% 20
%
Q
U
E
ST
IO
N
S
 O
F
 O
PI
N
IO
N
 
SU
R
V
E
Y
IN
D
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
U
SS
IA
 R
E
SP
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
R
es
po
ns
e 
(I
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s:
N
o.
 o
f 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 =
  T
ot
al
 5
)
R
es
po
ns
e 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
I.
 I
N
V
O
LV
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
IN
 M
O
N
IT
O
R
IN
G
 O
F
 A
C
C
E
SS
 T
O
 G
E
N
E
T
IC
 R
E
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
 
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
(o
r a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
) p
ro
vi
de
 to
 in
vo
lv
e 
yo
ur
 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
it
or
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ac
ce
ss
 
an
d 
ut
ili
za
tio
n 
of
 g
en
et
ic
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
or
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
IT
K
 b
y 
th
e 
us
er
s?
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
 p
ol
ic
y 
or
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
 p
ro
vi
de
s t
o 
in
vo
lv
e 
ou
r 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
it
or
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ac
ce
ss
/ u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
ge
ne
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s b
y 
th
e 
us
er
s?
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
or
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
. (
3)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
. (
2)
0% 60
%
0% 40
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
 p
ol
ic
y 
or
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
 p
ro
vi
de
s t
o 
in
vo
lv
e 
ou
r 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
it
or
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ac
ce
ss
/ u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
ge
ne
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s b
y 
th
e 
us
er
s?
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
or
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
.
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(2
)
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
. (
3)
0% 0% 40
%
60
%
W
ill
 y
ou
r c
ou
nt
ry
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
it
or
in
g 
th
e 
ac
ce
ss
 a
nd
 
ut
ili
za
tio
n 
of
 g
en
et
ic
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
or
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
IT
K
 b
y 
th
e 
us
er
 
co
un
tr
ie
s (
us
ua
lly
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s)?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 e
ff
ec
ti
ve
ly
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
ito
ri
ng
. 
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 
m
on
ito
ri
ng
, b
ut
 fo
r n
am
es
ak
e.
 (3
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
. (
2)
0% 60
%
0% 40
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 e
ff
ec
ti
ve
ly
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 m
on
ito
ri
ng
. 
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
ou
ld
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 
m
on
ito
ri
ng
, b
ut
 fo
r n
am
es
ak
e.
 (1
)
N
o 
A
B
S 
in
st
ru
m
en
t i
s e
vo
lv
ed
 o
r e
vo
lv
in
g 
in
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y 
(2
)
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
. (
2)
0% 20
%
40
%
40
%
J.
 C
H
E
C
K
 O
F
 B
IO
PI
R
A
C
Y
 
A
nd
 if
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
/in
st
itu
te
s o
r c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 il
le
ga
l t
ra
ns
fe
r/ 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
of
 g
en
et
ic
 re
so
ur
ce
 to
 
us
er
 c
ou
nt
ry
/c
or
po
ra
tio
n,
 w
ill
 y
ou
r 
IL
C
s 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
he
ck
 th
e 
il
le
ga
l 
tr
an
sf
er
 (m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
? 
Y
es
, o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 c
he
ck
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
th
e 
ill
eg
al
 tr
an
sf
er
 (m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
.
Y
es
, o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 c
he
ck
 th
e 
il
le
ga
l t
ra
ns
fe
r 
(m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
, b
ut
 w
ith
 m
ix
ed
 re
su
lts
.
N
o,
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
N
O
T
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
he
ck
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
th
e 
ill
eg
al
 tr
an
sf
er
 (m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
. (
3)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
2)
0% 0% 60
%
40
%
Y
es
, o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 c
he
ck
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
th
e 
ill
eg
al
 tr
an
sf
er
 (m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
. (
1)
Y
es
, o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 c
he
ck
 th
e 
il
le
ga
l t
ra
ns
fe
r 
(m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
, b
ut
 w
ith
 m
ix
ed
 re
su
lts
. (
1)
N
o,
 o
ur
 I
L
C
s 
ar
e 
N
O
T
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
he
ck
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
th
e 
ill
eg
al
 tr
an
sf
er
 (m
is
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n)
. (
1)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. (
2)
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%
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%
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%
40
%
D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
A
B
S 
re
gi
m
e 
at
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
 a
nd
 n
at
io
na
l 
A
B
S 
re
gi
m
e 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 st
op
 th
e 
bi
op
ir
ac
y 
(i
f 
an
y)
 o
f 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 
ge
ne
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
IT
K
? 
Y
es
, t
o 
la
rg
e 
ex
te
nt
. (
1)
Y
es
, t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
. (
2)
N
o,
 n
ot
 a
t a
ll.
 (2
)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
. 
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40
%
40
%
0%
Y
es
, t
o 
la
rg
e 
ex
te
nt
. (
1)
Y
es
, t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
. (
3)
N
o,
 n
ot
 a
t a
ll.
 (1
)
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
.
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: N
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io
na
l A
B
S 
R
eg
im
e:
 O
pi
ni
on
s o
f C
BD
/N
P 
Pa
rt
ie
s (
Q
.B
 F
or
m
at
) 
Q
.N
o.
Q
U
E
ST
IO
N
S
 O
F
 O
PI
N
IO
N
 S
U
R
V
E
Y
R
E
SP
O
N
SE
 O
P
T
IO
N
S
In
di
a
R
us
si
a
A
. P
A
R
T
IC
IP
A
T
IO
N
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
IN
 A
B
S 
P
O
L
IC
Y
/L
A
W
 M
A
K
IN
G
 A
N
D
 N
E
G
O
T
IA
T
IO
N
 P
R
O
C
E
S
SE
S
1
W
he
th
er
 o
r 
no
t t
he
 in
di
ge
no
us
 a
nd
 lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
it
ie
s 
(I
L
C
s)
 w
er
e/
ar
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 ta
ki
ng
 p
ar
t i
n 
na
tio
na
l A
B
S 
la
w
/p
ol
ic
y 
m
ak
in
g?
Y
es
, t
o 
la
rg
e 
ex
te
nt
.
Y
es
, t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
.
N
o,
 n
ot
 a
t a
ll.
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
.
1
4
2
W
as
/i
s 
IL
C
s’
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 a
ct
iv
e 
or
 p
as
si
ve
? 
A
ct
iv
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Pa
ss
iv
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
N
o 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
1
3
3
W
er
e/
ar
e 
th
e 
co
nc
er
ns
, v
oi
ce
s 
or
 v
ie
w
po
in
ts
 o
f 
IL
C
s 
re
sp
ec
te
d,
 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 o
r i
nc
or
po
ra
te
d 
in
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l A
B
S 
po
lic
y/
la
w
?
Y
es
, t
o 
la
rg
e 
ex
te
nt
.
Y
es
, t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
.
N
o,
 n
ot
 a
t a
ll.
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
.
1
2
B
. N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 O
F
 C
U
ST
O
M
A
R
Y
 L
A
W
S
/I
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
S 
O
F
 I
L
C
s
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In
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
.1
2.
1 
of
 N
ag
oy
a 
P
ro
to
co
l, 
do
es
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
th
e 
cu
st
om
ar
y 
la
w
/
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 o
f y
ou
r i
nd
ig
en
ou
s p
eo
pl
e?
1.
  
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 h
as
 s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
2.
  
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
3.
  
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
1
1
C
. N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 O
F
 I
L
C
s 
IN
 I
S
SU
IN
G
 P
IC
 A
N
D
 M
A
T
5
Sh
al
l t
he
 n
at
io
na
l A
B
S
 p
ol
ic
y/
la
w
 r
es
pe
ct
 th
e 
IL
C
s’
 r
ig
ht
 to
 g
ra
nt
 
F
PI
C
 a
nd
 r
ig
ht
 to
 s
ig
n 
M
A
Ts
, a
nd
 in
 w
ha
t w
ay
? 
Y
es
, t
o 
la
rg
e 
ex
te
nt
. 
Y
es
, t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
.
N
o,
 n
ot
 a
t a
ll.
I 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
.
2*
1
6
In
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
.6
.1
 a
nd
 A
rt
ic
le
.6
.2
 o
f 
N
ag
oy
a 
P
ro
to
co
l, 
do
es
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
PI
C
 m
an
da
to
ry
 
be
fo
re
 a
cc
es
s/
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
of
 g
en
et
ic
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 o
r 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 I
T
K
?
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
an
da
to
ry
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
Y
es
, t
he
 P
IC
 is
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 n
ot
 m
an
da
to
ry
.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
m
en
ti
on
 o
f 
PI
C
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
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Q
.N
o.
Q
U
E
ST
IO
N
S
 O
F
 O
PI
N
IO
N
 S
U
R
V
E
Y
R
E
SP
O
N
SE
 O
P
T
IO
N
S
In
di
a
R
us
si
a
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D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f 
IL
C
s 
in
 c
re
at
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
/ 
fo
rm
at
 o
f 
PI
C
? 
1.
  
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 h
as
 s
uc
h 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
2.
  
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y.
3.
  
I 
am
 n
ot
 a
w
ar
e.
1
2
8
Is
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y 
co
m
m
it
te
d 
to
 c
on
su
lt
, i
nv
ol
ve
 o
r 
en
ga
ge
 th
e 
IL
C
s 
in
 is
su
in
g 
th
e 
PI
C
 to
 u
se
r 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
be
fo
re
 a
cc
es
si
ng
/ u
ti
li
zi
ng
 a
ny
 
ge
ne
ti
c 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 I
T
K
?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 f
ul
ly
 c
om
m
it
te
d.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 s
om
ew
ha
t c
om
m
it
te
d.
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 h
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 m
an
da
te
.
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
.
1
1
9
A
s 
en
vi
sa
ge
d 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
.5
.1
 o
f 
N
ag
oy
a 
P
ro
to
co
l, 
do
es
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
A
B
S 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
lic
y 
in
cl
ud
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f d
ra
ft
in
g 
th
e 
m
ut
ua
lly
 
ag
re
ed
 te
rm
s 
(M
A
T
) 
on
 e
qu
it
y 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
, o
pp
os
in
g 
th
e 
do
m
in
at
in
g 
po
si
tio
ns
 o
f u
se
r c
ou
nt
rie
s (
us
ua
lly
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 n
at
io
ns
)?
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 h
as
 le
ga
l p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 A
B
S
 la
w
/p
ol
ic
y 
to
 d
ra
ft
 
M
A
T
 o
n 
eq
ui
ty
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s.
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 h
as
 le
ga
l p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 A
B
S
 la
w
/p
ol
ic
y 
to
 d
ra
ft
 
M
A
T,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 o
n 
eq
ui
ty
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s.
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 h
as
 n
o 
le
ga
l p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 A
B
S 
la
w
/p
ol
ic
y 
to
 d
ra
ft 
M
A
T.
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
.
1
1
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 a
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of
 A
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2.
3(
b)
 o
f 
N
ag
oy
a 
P
ro
to
co
l, 
do
es
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
 p
ol
ic
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
en
ga
gi
ng
 y
ou
r 
IL
C
s 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
M
A
T
? 
1.
  
Y
es
, o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 A
B
S
 la
w
/p
ol
ic
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
en
ga
gi
ng
 I
L
C
s 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
M
A
T.
2.
  
N
o,
 o
ur
 c
ou
nt
ry
 h
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 A
B
S 
la
w
/p
ol
ic
y.
3.
 
I 
ca
nn
ot
 s
ay
.
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In
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
.1
2.
3(
a)
 o
f 
N
ag
oy
a 
P
ro
to
co
l, 
do
es
 y
ou
r 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 c
om
m
un
it
y 
pr
ot
oc
ol
s 
be
fo
re
 g
ra
nt
in
g 
an
y 
PI
C
 to
 u
se
rs
 o
f 
IT
K
?
Y
es
, o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
ev
ol
vi
ng
 A
B
S
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n/
po
li
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f c
om
m
un
ity
 p
ro
to
co
ls
.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 o
ur
 e
xi
st
in
g/
 e
vo
lv
in
g 
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В соответствии с Нагойским протоколом регулирования доступа к генетическим ресурсам 
и совместного пользования на справедливой и равной основе выгод от их применения (ABS) 
Индия разработала законодательные акты и нормативные механизмы, в то время как 
Россия находится в процессе разработки такого законодательства. Признание коренных 
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